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The Naval Postgraduate School must, by default, make use
of teaching cases in information technology case studies
oriented or based upon corporations. It has been difficult
for the school to obtain such studies oriented to the
military, much less the United States Navy.
This thesis provides the Naval Postgraduate School with
three teaching oases concerning automated information systems
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Z. ZN•RODUCTZON
A Case study is a process by which learning experiences
are related to students through the posing and solution of a
problem in order that some educational benefit be attained.
The written expression of a noteworthy, information
technology-related problem to be solved by students in the
context of a case study is the challenge met by this thesis.
This thesis is concerned with studying and constructing
militarily-oriented case studies in order to instruct Computer
System Management (CSM) students at the Naval Postgraduate
School (NPS). Specifically, the instruction in aimed at
instances of automated information management performing
routine, yet normally manpower-intensive, tasks facing the
officers and men of the United States Navy.
The U. S. Navy needs case studies in management situations
peculiar to its own operating environment. Developments in
information technology need to ' demonstrated to military
graduate students in their own operating language. A better
understanding of the information management problems found in
the fleet will be gained by NPS instructors and students alike
from cases based upon actual fleet experience.
The author's experiences as a naval aviator in a
helicopter squadron aboard an aircraft carrier from 1986
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through 1988 provided the insight and research material for
the case studies to be presented. Those experiences also
provide the framework and dictate the setting for each of the
case studies.
Computer system management education received at the Naval
Postgraduate School has been enlightening yet not well-suited
to fleet applications faced by most junior naval officers.
Most examples of information management and technology in
teaching cases are geared toward experiences in the civilian
corporation world.
A. Objectives
The objectives of this thesis are threefold. The first
objective is to establish a precedent for Naval Postgraduate
School students to develop their own fleet experiences into
instructional lessons through the case study tool. The
second objective is to provide insights into applications of
data-processing technology for the hardware and software
already existing in the fleet. The third objective is to
encourage the development of new and innovative information
systems applications for the United States Navy.
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B. Research Questions
1. Can the introduction of computer-based information
systems and the implementation of database technology
improve the maintenance of performance records for the
operations department of a unit-level command?
2. Can tactical antisubmarine warfare (ASW) efficiency be
improved by local area network technology?
3. Can a decision support system (DSS) enhance tactical
shipboard readiness and training?
C. Axeas of Research
Specific areas of research and writing are: information
systemis management, database systems, local area network
technology; and decision support systems. These subject
areas will be demonstrated through fleet examples in a
carrier-borne helicopter squadron.
The compilation of operational reports generated on a unit
command level demands the utmost in coordination from all
departments and divisions in the organization. The
institution of a database as a tool of preparation for the
organization's reports and record-keeping would enhance the
quality of important statements as well as ease some of the
strain of coordination on those responsible for the groundwork
of summary reports. The implementation lf an organizational
database designed to quickly and efficiently compile the
operational reports for a unit command-level USN organization
is the subject of the first case study.
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Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) is an information-intensive
effort. Killing a submarine means a high price paid in the
form of acoustic sensors and the technology necessary to
coordinate the information which those sensors produce. The
coordination of that ASW information allows for an eventual
targeting solution of the underwater platform. It is
critical to the ASW effort to employ a command and control
center of information which can develop and execute an ASW
evolution. This center is normally the ASW Module of an
aircraft carrier. The various inputs to this center of
command and control are varied and numerous. At present,
there is very little state-of-the-art technology applied to
the methods which this information is handled. ASW
information is still being processed in much the same manner
as it was in the late 1950's. It lacks automated data
processing. The incorporation of a local area network (LAN)
inside the ASW command and control center so as to improve the
efficiency of the information processing and dissemination is
the subject of the second case study.
Decision support systems can be designed to reduce the
strain of -mmand decision-making when alternatives and their
probabilities can be modeled and programmed to compute a
solution. Specific tactical environments give rise to
programmed solutions derived through decision support systems.
Decision support system technology can improve command-level
warfare training by presenting crucial alternatives and their
4
respective probabilities for consideration to decision-makers.
The processing of ASW contact information and the resultant
initial actions of a capital ship is the subject of the third
case study.
The case studies presented here are an attempt to bring
home the practicality of information technology to solving
pertinent and common operational and administrative challenges
in the United States Navy at unit-level commands.
The research conducted was rather unique in that it
consisted purely of fleet experience. Each of the three case
studies which make up this thesis is based on actual events
which took place in the author's experience.
The importance of this research effort is underlined by
the fact that research was done in the fleet. This research
will demonstrate to students at the Naval Postgraduate School
that fleet information management problems can be solved by
fleet personnel using hardware and software in place in the
fleet today.
This research consists of the development of three case
studies demonstrating naval applications of management
information systems technology. The three case studies are
concerned with the following specific areas: information
systems management and database systems; local area network
technology; and decision support systems.
Each of these areas will be introduced and developed in
the format of a case study for graduate-level students.
5
Students will be asked to develop solutions to probler cases
involving typical information resource management challenges
to US armed forces.
6
11. !UACNZNG CASE 1: 3NQ OQV3MOhD
The time was 1730 aboard USS Ranger, an aircraft carrier.
Four helicopter aircrewmen walked toward the 'stack' during a
lull in flight ops to preflight thei.r helicopter for a night
launch. Their heads were swiveling to keep themselves out of
trouble. On a carrier flight deck, everything you don't see
will not only hurt you--it'll kill you! It was 75 days into
a scheduled 90-day line period in the Indian Ocean.
The helicopter aircraft commander of an SH-3 Sea King
helicopter (HAC) was a newly frocked commander with the call
sign of Ozone. He was the Operations Officer for the
This case was prepared by Lieutenant Marc The'berge, USN,
while a student at the Naval Postgraduate School, under the
direction of Prof. William Haga. It is designtd as a basis
for class discussion.
Distributed by the Naval Postgraduate School. All rights
reserved to the author and the Naval Postgraduate School.
Permission to use the case should be obtained from the
Department of Administrative Sciences, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California, 93943.
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holicoptor squadron onboard. Ozone was a rising star in
naval aviation. Everybody knew he would be selected for
aviation command at the next selecti.,n board. He had an
outstanding record. He was a good pilot, personable, usually
quite efficient and politician among naval officers. 7he SM,
or second pilot, was Ltjg. McMahon, new to carrier aviation
life. Mcliahon went by 'Carrot' for his bright red hair.
He listened to every word out of Ozone. Carrot wanted to
be just like Ozonel
Ozone and Carrot preflighted their aircraft. Afterwards
they retired to the squadron wardroom for coffee and a night
of standing Alert 30. The Alert 30 was an overnight watch
where the aircrew would be standing by to launch in the case
of an emergency (e.g., medical evacuation or man overboard
rescue). The aircrew could sleep or eat or watch television
but they had to be ready to fly on 30 minutes notice.
As the Ops officer, Ozone was responsible for the daily
flight operations of the holo squadron. It was his
responsibility to ensure that each holo pilot flew enough
hours each month to maintain a high flying proficiency.
Also, it was his business to make sure that each pilot flew
with all the requisite qualifications such as night
proficiency, Natops (Naval Aviation Training and Operations
Procedures) and instrument flight.
Lately, flight operations had been day-intensive. It was
becoming difficult to keep all the squadron's pilots night
8
qualified. A helo pilot had to fly once at night every two
weeks to be considered safe and legal in accordance with
Natops and squadron operating procedures. Records of flight
frequency were maintained by the Ozone's squadron operations
department.
The records of squadron flights were kept by two junior
enlisted men. Both of them were third class petty officer
rescue swimmers. Highly-trained and motivated to jump from
helicopters to rescue aircrow adrift in the u-ian, they were
not enthusiastic about flight record maintenance. They were
not supervised in how they kept flight and qualification
records. These records were kept up-to-date on accounting-
type ledgers. The records were maintained manually although
the squadron had a personal computer Lnd database management
system software in the same workspace.
The young petty officers made it a practice to keep up
with recording as much as they could. Because they weren't
troublemakers the division chief didn't bother with them.
The database for the squadron' s record of flights consisted of
four stacks of incomplete ledgers each holding about a
thousand flight records.
Ozone know all this; he expected his successor to clear up
this problem.
Night alerts lasted twelve hours. The night alert crew
was briefed and posted at 1800 each night and relieved each
morning at 0600.
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The time was 03C0. Ranger was sliding through the black
waves of the Indian Ocean. A starboard lookout noticed a red
light passing by the side of the ship. "Man Overboardl"
sounded the alarm.
Ozone had turned in for the night.. So had the enlisted
aircrewmen. Carrot was watching a movie in the squadron
ready room that was well beneath his dignity.
When the alarm sounded over the ship's loudspeakers,
Carrot grabbed his flight gear and headed for the flight deck
with the conviction of a modern-day hero on his way to rescue
a hapless shipmate. Carrot made it to the pro-positioned helo
in two minutes. Already, the entire flight deck was coming
to life in the dark. Flight deck personnel were preparing
for'a launch in their sleep, some in their underwear.
carrot got both engines lit off in another two minutes.
The checklists weren't meant for this type of situation. The
aircraft was ready to engage its rotors in six minutes flat|
That was a record for the helo squadron!
Ozone was definitely getting too old for this kind of
thing. Ten minutes after the alarm, he made it to the
aircraft. His mind was in a fog of sleep when the rotor
blades started to turn. The helo launched eighteen minutes
after the alarm. It was dark---very dark, something helo
pilots called 'Varsity Dark.' It was a demanding flight
environment. Even for an aviation commander with Ozone's
experience. There was no horizon.
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Ozone asked for a vector to the light in the water. He
didn't get an answer on the radio. He tried the other radio
and the result was the same. He was handling two radios,
flying the halo and trying to save a life simultaneously. He
didn't trust his young and inexperienced copilot in this
situation.
Ozone prepared a manual approach to a hover altitude of 40
feet above the water. A descent performed manually is an
enmergency procedure and this was an emargencyl It was the
most dangerous of maneuvers of night aviation. Without
visual references, flying within a hundred feet of the water
could be a 'one-night stand.'
Carrot was slapped in the face by a wave. He was in the
waterl What happenedl The halo had hit the water and'"the
aircrew had been thrown from it as the craft disintegrated.
The airorew huddled together for warmth and security, they
hoped and prayed for their comrades to reacue them. Besides
cuts and bruises, nio one was hurt. However, the halo was
lost!
Ozone was beside himself. His Navy career had just
concluded. The helicopter airorew were eventually rescued.
The original man overboard alarm proved to be the imagination
of an anxious lookout.
The next day, Ozone was a celebrity onboard the sh..p. It
wasn't Just anybody that could drive a halo into the ocean and
come back, much less come back without a scratchl
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There was to be an accident board. This board would be
comprised of other halo pilots and together they would review
all the events surrounding the case. It would convene in two
days.
Ozone had two days to get his flight records into shape.
Surely the accident board would ask for the ha-lo squadron's
flight schedules and records for all involved in the accident.
The evening before the board was a busy one for the flight
record petty officers. They worked to compile an accurate
picture of the flight qualifications of the downed aircrew.
One glaring problem stood out. It seemed that their boss,
Ozone, had gone flying that night without a night qual. This
would be damning to the halo commander if it were brought to
light in the investigation. To fly at night without a night
qual was a serious mistake alone. However, to do this and
crash an aircraft was the end of a career. If only the
flight records had been maintained in a more professional
fashion, this scheduling error probably would never have
happened.
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111. TZACXNG QIOTSO: INh O3IMORD
A. Overview
A database can be a solution to certain organizational and
operational problems. The development of a database and the
ongoing maintenance it requires can be unique to each
organization. However, there are certain commonalities to
all databases and those qualities can be extended to fleet
applications. The need and uniqueness of each database can
be demonstrated only by the existing organizational record-
keeping system.
There are two objectives of this case study. Primarily,
this exercise is designed to introduce a student to the use of
computer-based information systems and to the database
concept. This is accomplished through the demonstration of
the needs that can be satisfied by the institution of an
information system and a database management system in an
organization.
Secondly, this case study demands innovation in database
organization from those relatively new to automated data
processing as well as seasoned MIS professionals. A
programmed solution to the database problem posed is provided
for the teacher to demonstrate.
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Generally, the problem here is the lack of a computerized
information system and database management system in
particular. Accurate compilation and maintenance of records
of any kind requires some sort of efficient database
management system. This squadron does not have a working
database system. All unit-level commands in the U, S. Navy
(which includes such squadrons) possess desktop personal
computers and most have database management software. This
helo squadron possessed the hardware and software to effect an
improved system of database management. Normally, unit-level
commands have at least one person that understands PC's and
could construct a database for applications such as flight
records. However, this is not always the case. It must be
kept in mind that possible solutions to lack of training in
personal computers and database management systems is part of
the solution in this case study.
This case is about a problem in records maintenance. For
"a group of MIS students, it may immediately suggest a need for
"a DBMS. However, that solution provokes the question, by
what metric is DBMS better than the present manual method of
keeping records? Students may assume that a DBMS is better,
that it is patently obvious. They must justify this as a
solution in terms of expected performance of the system as
well as costs and benefits to the organization.
The case also implies a leadership issue. A DBMS may be
suggested as a solution and to that extent, students may be
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substituting information technology for the possibly deficient
leadership on the part of the operations officer.
Employing information technology can enhance a career,
chiefly be improving effectiveness at handling a job. Some
students may suggest that information technology is just
another bit of DOD faddism, another wasteful boondoggle...
The squadron had no database. Therefore, its records
lacked completeness, accuracy and an audit trail for all
squadron operational and administrative functions. This was
true even though the squadron had the requisite hardware and
applications software. These resources were not being used.
Using them, trying them, investing in learning them was not
going to make anyone a hero on their next fitness report.
Worse, people who monkey around with this technology might be
labelled as a hacker nerd rather than being pictured as a
capable ship driver or aircraft jockey.
How are MIS graduates going to train people in the fleet
to start putting the information technology to work for
themselves and their mission? How are junior enlisted going
to learn something as potent and possibly productive as DBMS
unless CSM graduates teach them. If they don't learn it, the
fleet loses a good measure of potential gains in productivity.
Yet, we won't do it if the CO or XO looks upon it with
disdain.
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This squadron, as a microcosm of similar tactical level
field/operational units, probably needs to create a new
organizational billet for a database administrator.
Someone schooled in the organizational advantages that
flow from employing information technology has an obligation
to pole and prod CO's/XO's to appreciate those advantages and
encourage adoption of the technology.
-- Push students to specify these advantages.
-- Lead them into a discussion of the "how" of
prodding senior superiors.
Should responsibility for an MIS activity be a collateral
duty -- as it is now -- or xhould it be the primary billet of
an MIS graduate?
--- Resistances to this decision that pursuing MIS would
wreck my careerl the opportunity cost would be missing the
chance for operational command.
--- Yes, but Ozone wrecked his career because he lacked the
support of an information system.
A technical aspect of this case can include a discussion
of the need for data standards in the maintenance of a DBMS.
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What ought to be the division of labor between
commissioned ranks and enlisted ranks in dealing with IS?
One suggestion can be that officers should have the skill to
create applications that will benefit the work of their
departments while enlisted personnel aught to be involved in
running applications, doing data entry, generating reports and
making database queries. A dimension of this discussion must
be that some officers have no computer literacy while many
enlisted people are computer wizards. There are aspects of
social structure here (rank, hierarchy, dirty hands avoidance,
etc.) that are barriers to this division of labor or to the
usage of the skills possessed by lower ranks.
Another technical aspect of this case is the question of
what kind of data base would be appropriate: relational?
flat file? network? This is an opportunity to apply a grasp
of the advantages and disadvantages of each database
architecture gained in earlier courses.
a. Case Use
This case study was prepared for use in the Computer
Systems Management Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California. It can also be used by
students from other curricula, studying the basic concepts of
information systems. The case is of particular value in
introducing the need and usefulness of management information
systems. It has application in demonstrating the needs for an
17
organizational database to students to IS 3183, 'Management of
Information Systems.'
C. Analysis of came
(1) Problem Statement:
The squadron operationa 4*partment currently lacks a sound
database management system designed to track 4he operational
performance of aviators.
(2) Author's Analysis:
Quits simply, there was no accurate database of flight
hour or flight qualification information. Also conspicuous is
the lack of a knowledgeable database administrator.
(3) Recommendationst
Personal microcomputers are in place in unit-level
commands such as this squadron fleet-wide. Database
management software (e.g. Ashton-Tate's 'dBase IV') is
available to this type of command. Squadron personnel should
be charged with the specification or creation of a database
application specific to the needs of the organization. This
solution to squadron necessities should be tested, implemented
and offered to similar aviation commands. Should there be a
18
lack of database management software-trained individuals, the
appropriate training should be provided by the organization
for those who would use it.
A database administrator, preferably an officer or chief
petty officer, should be installed to oversee the proper
maintenance of the flight record and any other database to be
used by the squadron.
Both fully relational and non-relational database
management systems should be considered in the selection of
the database management software. Xn either case, the
software to be chosen must be PC-driven and user-friendly.
19
XV. TUKINHZNG CI 2: SUBUNT
The 0530 brief was called to order in the helicopter
squadron ready room aboard USS Ranger, a conventionally-
powered aircraft catrier. Helicopter aircrewmen took their
seats. They awaited information about an upcoming ASW
(antisubmarine warfare) mission. Ltjg 'Snake' McDonald was
the Squadron Duty Officer (SDO) that morning. He had been up
all night preparing this tactical brief. The Ranger
battlegroup was beginning the ASW phase of their operational
evaluation prior to their Western Pacific/Indian Ocean '89
Cruise.
This case was prepared by Lieutenant Marc The'berge, USN,
as a student at the Naval Postgraduate School, under the
direction of Prof. William Haga. It is designed as a basis
for class discussion.
Distributed by the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California. All rights reserved to the author and the Naval
Postgraduate School. Permission to use the case should be
obtained from the Naval Postgraduate School, Department of
Administrative Sciences, Monterey, California, 93943.
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Helicopters are important players in battlegroup ASW.
Specifically, carrier-borne SH-3H Sea King helicopters are
employed to use different forms of sonar to identify, locate
and track submarines. They also can be armed with torpedoes
to attack submerged targets. An H-3 helo can use its
variable depth sonar to locate, track and target subs. They
can also employ soncbuoys which are air-launched, salt water-
activated listening devices for the same purposes. By using
sonar and sonobuoys, as well as acoustic homing torpedoes, the
H-3 is a formidable opponent for any submarine. Normally,
the H-3 helicopter is used to protect the aircraft carrier and
other battlegroup ships from underwater attack.
Snake began with the weather report. It was to be a
sunny day in Hawaiian waters. Miles of visibility and no
clouds were predicted.
Next, predicted acoustic conditions for the operating area
were given by Petty Officer Third Class Vasquez. He provided
predicted ranges for passive and active detection for
sonobuoys and the H-3 dipping sonar against the day's TOI's
(targets of interest). Of course, as all helo aircrew know,
these predicted conditions are never very uccurate and it
takes a BT (bathythermographic reading) on the spot to really
know the acoustic conditions of the ASW battlefield. Once
BT's are taken by the helos and transmitted back to the ship's
ASW module, they can provide useful tactical information to
ASW aircrew. That is, it will be useful if the information
21
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gets to the aircrew in time to become integrated into the
tactical plan. In the heat of battle this rarely happens.
Two helo crews were told they would be flying as an ASW
screen for the carrier. The helo skipper and the Ops officer
were the 'Hacs' (helicopter aircraft commanders) in this
screen. They would deploy passive sonobuoy patterns in front
the ship, searching for hostile submarines. If they got a
potential submarine contact, they would use active dipping
sonar to simulate multiple fire control solutions in this
exercise. Simultaneously, upon receiving word of a hot
contact, a third aircrew would join in the underwater hunt.
Lt. 'Razzle' Simons and Ltjg. 'Dazzle' Davis, would man the
alert helo.
After the assignment of aircraft to each of the aircrews
and a detailed discussion of the tactius, the brief concluded.
As usual, aircrew were directed to the ASW module for
answers to their questions about the conduct of the mission.
It was 0630 as the flight crews moved to the mess for
breakfast.
Snake mentally patted himself on the back for putting
together a strong brief. The squadron maintenance department
chief hailed him over the 'bitch-box.' The chief said it was
unlikely that the squadron would have three functional
aircraft for the day's first event. Probably only two would
be available. The skipper would have to be informed but the
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chief advised that it would be better to tell him after
breakfast. Snake agreed.
In Ranger's Flag Tactical Command Center aboard Ranger,
Lodr. 'Hoops' Ball received information from battlegroup
- •. electronic support measures (3SM) about the location of 'bad
"guy' submarines. Being a F-14 radar intercept officer, he
entertained the idea of launching a couple of Tomcats to
investigate. He decided to discuss the situation later with
his relief during passdown of his watch. It was now 0700.
The ASW exercise was to begin at 0900. That ESM bearing was
directly across the carrier's planned track.
Up on the bridge, Captain Tom Gallery was watching the
morning flight deck activities from his CO's chair. He was
proud of his ship and looked forward to a day of victory in
the battlegroup exercises. He took the occasion to broadcast
over the ship's public address system a reward of duty-free
liberty in the next port for any sailor sighting a periscope
that day. If anything would keep the lookouts alert for
submarines, extra liberty would.
The helo crews manned up their aircraft for the 0830
launch. During preflight check, the skipper's aircraft went
down with a fuel leak. Snake had forgotten to tell the
skipper about one of the helos being down for the day.
The helo skipper was furious. He ordered the Ops 0 to
hand over his aircraft to him. The Razzle-Dazzle crew,
watching from the flight deck, thought this was hilarious
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until it dawned on them that they could lose their aircraft to
the Ops 01
The ASW module was already receiving reports of periscope
sightings. All wanting a duty-free port visit. There were
going to be a lot of those reports. The one phone line to
the module was going to be busy all day.
The helo squadron maintenance department was in an uproarl
Airorew were playing musical aircraft on the flight deck. It
was rumored the CO, in all his rage, had fired the maintenance
offioerl Tbere was no way the below-deck managers could get
a firm grip on flight deck evolutions. The maintenance chief
called Snake again, "Sir, we've lost the bubble."
Snake was in the middle of pasadown to his relief and was
too tired to care. No one seemed to know what was going on!
Getting through to the ASW module for a tactical update was
impossible.
By 0840 no helos were airborne. Captain Gallery called
the helo ready room for an explanation. Snake's pasadown to
the new SDO was useless. Too much was happening! The new
SDO, Lt. Cowboy Taylor, had told Snake to go to bed and he
would take care of everything. Cowboy had barely gotten his
first chaw of Redman when the captain called. At a loss for
words, Cowboy swallowed his chaw.
Tactical Flag had undergone a pasadown too. The new
watch officer took interest in the ESM information from
earlier that morning. Just then, he got another tipper about
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a possible sub. He tried to call the halo guys to let them
know. Unfortunately, the halo ready room phone was busy.
At 0910, the halo skipper was ready to launch. The
flight deck was back in order; Razzle and Dazzle were
positioned in the alert halo. Tactical Flag got through to
the halo ready room but with the launch imminent, no
information could reach the halo. The ASW module was still
deluged with reports of submarine sightings. The halo
finally launched.
From the bridge, Captain Gallery saw a green flare burning
in the water off the port bow. Green flares are simulated
.ttack signals from submarines to surface ships. The carrier
had become a simulated kill. The battle was over before the
carrier had started to fightl
"What the hell happened?"
The airborne halo too, saw the green flare. "If I've
still got a job when I land I'll find another way to do
business!" the halo skipper moaned.
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V. uacRlzxo lO.ZI: stoM
A. overview
A major issue of information systems technology is the
decentralization of information. Systems analysts must study
information needs in-depthly in order to adequately build a
system which will suffice those needs through
decentralization. Whether or not decentralization is really
necessary in a system can only be determined through actual
observation of the information distribution technology already
in place.
The dilemma faced by the organizations in this case study
is the lack of an automated system of distributed information
sharing. Rapid and accurate sharing of information requires
a distributed processing system such as a computer network.
The organizations presented are engaged in an antisubmarine
war-fLghting effort without such a system.
Naval warfare today is characterized by a large degree of
information sharing. Currently, aboard U. S. aircraft
oarriers, most tactical information is distributed via
phoneline and voice. This process is time-oonsuming, limited
and prone to error. The introduction of automated
distributed systems such as the local area network (LAN) could
improve the state of tactical information sharing onboard
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carriers. Tactical advantage can be preserved and enhanced
by an accurate and timely flow of battlefield intelligence.
Electronic message processing and accessibility to common
databases coupled with savings in hardware expenditures are
. advantages to be gained for any organization through the
implementation of a local area network.
All unit-level commands in the U. S. Navy (which includes
ships and aviation squadrons) possess microcomputers.
Network hardware and software that can link microcomputers of
separate commands aboard a ship is currently not available.
Therefore, tactical information sharing amongst naval
shipboard microcomputers does not exist.
Accordingly, tactical efforts, such as carrier-borne ASW
are not armed with the hardware and software to improve a
"system of information resource management.
By way of synopsis:
** The primary objective is to integrate multiple
application subsystems to form a comprehensive, integrated ASW
information system.
** The secondary objective is to enable a better
communication system between various ASW assets in order to
achieve a more efficient command and control process.
There are three objectives of this case study.
Primarily, this exercise is designed to introduce the new MIS
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student to the distributed system concept. This is
accomplished through the demonstration of the needs that can
be satisfied by the institution of a distributed system in the
form of network in a organization. Secondly, this case study
demands innovation in local area network organization from
those relatively new to automated data processing as well as
seasoned MZS professionals. This is achieved by assigning
students the task of solving the question at the end of the
story. A solution to the information resource problem posed
is provided.
What is revealed by the maintenance chief conveying the
message that a helo is down but, in effect, don't tell anyone,
especially not the skipper or at least not until he has had a
decent breakfast.
The central issue in this case is local area networks.
Would a shipboard LAN be the final solution to the
difficulties portrayed in this case? First, permit the
students to generate their own suggestions for a solution.
But that discussion can only be fruitful if they fist have a
clear idea of the problem. Some time must be invested in a
sound framing of the problem. Then release them to pursue
solutions. One suggestion will surely be the installation
of a LAN.
What is the state of shipboard LAN's? Is the equipment
and software in lace? If in place, is it being used? What
are the barriers to the use of such systems? CO/XO
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dibinterest. Untrained department heads/division officers?
Lack og trained enlisted personnel? Lack of time to get
involved in readings documentation, learning systems?
Can we attribute and increase in tactical effectiveness to the
use of a shipboard LAN? Can we quantify tactical
effectiveness in a way that allow any causal inference related
to other variables? The point of this case is tactical
effectiveness failed in this instance. Whether quantifiable
or not, the CO had a clear sense of his ship's tactical
effectiveness and so did everyone else aboard shortly
afterward.
Conceptual elements to consider in a model of shipboard
information:
Weather
Sea conditions (temp, salinity, thermal layers)
Mission
Players (assignment of aircraft as a function of air-
craft maintenance.
Tactics
Tactical operations such as the helo receive and must
juggle information from as many as six sources, all separate
and distinct and ignorant of the others.
How effective can a helo pilot with all of that
information flooding in.... or key information not coming in at
all? The flag control center was whelmed by all kinds of
29
information. For example, all ASW information is routed
there first before it foes to the ASW module. Some self-
promoting people send every communication there as a way to
keep themselves visible to the skipper and his staff.
There is a problem with information that is hidden from
others of simply is lost in a shipboard information flow.
Would a LAN overcome that problem? What were the behaviors
of staff people with what was essentially hot operational
information?
What about the CO in this case? His wish is everyone's
command. He wants to find a subl Better to risk a
multitude of false alarms than miss the one time it is real.
The helo crews on deck don't know what's going on down in
the ready room. Likewise, the ready room has no clue as to
"what is happening up on deck. The ready room doesn't know a
helo is down. The helo skipper "fires" the helo maintenance
officer. Now the maintenance people don't whether this is
serious or an instance of anger and frustration. They don't,
in the heat of the moment, know to whom to turn for direction.
The ship CO hits the new watch officer just as he is
coming on duty. He is asked what is going on when he has the
least informed person in the scenario. With crew switches
taking place, no one is informing the ASW module because the
phone lines are busy with false sightings of subs. Could the
officers use the squawk box? Sound powered phones? Or does
protocol dictate that they must use the telephone?
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Describe the communication/information situation in the
ASW module. There seemed to be no way to inform the launched
holo of the information of an actual sighting. Cannot pass
tactical information on unsecured channel. Telephone lines
are routed through the ASW module but all lines are busy.
"The final objective is to demonstrate a benefit analysis
of two local area network solutions to the case study problem.
a. Case Use
This case study was prepared for use in the Computer
Systems Management Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California. It can also be used by
students from other curricula, studying the basic concepts of
information systems. It has particular application
demonstrating the needs for an organizational database to
students in IS 3183, 'Management of Information Systems.'
The case is of particular value in introducing the need and
usefulness of management information systems.
C. Analysis of Case
(1) Problem Statement:
The tactical antisubmarine effort depicted in this case
study lacks a sound information resource sharing (network)





Quite simply, there was no adequate method of sharing
information resources. Information pertaining to tactical
developments, equipment maintenance, ship's operational
planning, weather and intelligence wasnot being disseminated
amongst the organizations that needed it mostl Shortcomings
of the aircraft carrier and helicopter squadron in networking
and information distribution resulted in the tactical defeat
of a capital ship and strategic asset of the United States.
(3) Recommendationst
Personal microcomputers are in place in unit-level
commands such as the aircraft-carrior and helicopter aviation
squadron fleet-wide. Network hardware and software (such as
the examples provided in the economic analysis section of
these notes) should be made available to organizations such as
aircraft carriers. The very survival of such multi-billion
dollar organizations can depend upon the implementation of a
distributed information application specific to the needs of
the organization. Local area network t chnology and training
must take its place in U. S. naval organizations, such as an
aircraft carrier. Shipboard information resource-sharing
requirements are not satiated without network technology.
Should there be a lack of personal computer and network-
trained individuals, the appropriate training should be
provided by the organization for those who would use it.
32
Both the hardware and software to be chosen must be PC-
driven and user-friendly.
The system should be designed to connect the following
activities aboard the aircraft carrier: the ASW helicopter
squadron ready room; the ASW fixed-wing (S-3) squadron ready
room; weather service.; air wing maintenance control; the ASW
command module; the ship's combat information center; the
ship's bridge; and the tactical flag command center. Each of
these activities will be a node in SUBNET.
The topology for SU3MT will be a modified star design.
This design is illustrated on the following page. The design
was determined so as to ensure network survivability in case
of the loss of any node. The transmission medium to be
implemented in the network will be shielded coaxial cable.
This medium is impervious to the large amount of
electromagnetic interference to be found onboard ship. Also,
this is the least expensive of the qualified alternatives.
Technical considerations will be the most important issues
in the selection, implementation and maintenance of a carrier-
based ASW LAN. The system to evolve from this decision
statement and its implementation followup will be named
ST3NNT. A summary of priority features for this proposed
network is provided in the following pages.
Specific requirements for IUMST include the range of
functions to be performed as well as responsiveness of the
system. Functions to be performed by this syrtem include:
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electronic mail (PC MAIL); database management (DBASE IV)I
word processing (WORDPERFECT); and spreadsheet processing
(LOTUS). The LAN should process and manage these functions
with minimal user waiting time.
SUMS T hardware will be comprised of existing Zenith-248's
and a 386 LAN file server system to be determined. Software
for the network will also be determined. Hardware and
software required for the system will be purchased as one off-
the-shelf package. Shielded coaxial cablewill be selected
to connect the network as it is relatively inexpensive as well
as impervious to electromagnetic effects. DEC's PCLAN/SERVER
and the 3+OPEN LAN MANAGERf, VERSZON i.1, are the two
alternatives chosen for study in this case. The following
tables illustrate their respective attributes.
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PCLAN/S.RVER 3100 3+OPEN LAN
LIST PRICE $12,500 $3495
(INCLUDES SERVER)
NETWORK OPERATIONS




NUMBER OF SERVER 7 12
DISKS
ADD'L 0/S REQUIRED VMS OS/2 (INCLUDED)
DISK CACHING X X
RAM 414K TO 520K 520K TO 589K
FILE SERVER INFO
CONCURRENT OPEN
FILES PER SERVER UNLIMITED 8,000
DRIVES PER SERVER 14 12
MAX FILE SIZE 4GB 2GB
TOTAL DISK STORAGE 4GB 7.SGB
35
PCLAN/SERVER 3100 3+ OPEN LAN
ADMINISTRATION
KEEPS ACCOUNTING BY
USER OR RESOURCE X
REPORT #BAD PACKETS X X
REPORT NETWK ERRORS X X
MONITORS OPEN FILES X
SHOWS NAMES OF
USERS LOGGED ON X
SHOWS % SERVER USED X
SECURITY
ACCESS CAN BE
DETEPRHfNED BY GROUP X
ACCESS VIA LEVEL X X
USER FEATURES
E-MAIL
(STORE & FWD) X X
PRINTING
PRINTERS SUPPORTED 16 32
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An important aspect of this hardware and software
selection process for SRINT will be cost comparison. The
""3+OPEN LAN MANAGER definitely has a cost less than its
competitor. Even though a 386 LAN server must be purchased
,• separately, this will not make a great difference in overall
cost, assuming $4000 for the server.
A priority of great importance to SUNUIT will be its
sailor--proofing. This system munt be able to withstand daily
interface with largely computer-illiterate personnel. Fault
tolerance, or the ability of a system to recover after
erroneous inputs and component failures, will be a major
strength of the system. Both of these systems possess this
feature.
E-mail is a feature of both systems. A store-and-
forward message system is entailed in both networks being
considered.
Security is another desired feature of the network to
be chosen for SUDNTT. Both systems under consideration have
password xecurity as well as access to the system determined
by group.
All of the desired features for SU3NET are to be found
in both systems under consideration. The benefits of both
alternativem are therefore roughly the same. The $÷OPENLAN
VANAGUP. is therefore selected because of its lower cost.
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Students are invited to comment and criticize this
selection as well as originate their own solutions to the
problem.
38
"VI. TUAMNG CASH 3: BIUSARK
Eleven hundred feet of aircraft carrier slid by the
International Dateline. The sun was just up. All was well
"for the men and the ship.
It was an 0600 launch. The flight deck was just waking up
aboard the USS Ranger. The dawn patrol today consisted of
the ship's lifeguard, the SH-3 Sea Pig. It's job was to fly
ahead of the carrier, searching the ship's track for obstacles
such as any fishing nets, ships or islands that might be in
the way. Ranger was tracking east for San Diego at the end
of six months of cruising. She turned windline.
The halo was 'up & up' for the day's recon as well as
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) if the need arose. ASW was the
real mission of the halo drivers and they were good at itl
This case was prepared by Lieutenant Marc W. The'berge,
USN, under the direction of Prof. William Hag*, as a basis for
class discussion.
Distributed by the Naval Postgraduate School. All rights
reserved to the author and the Naval Postgraduate School.
Permission to use the case should be obtained from the
Department of Administrative Sciences, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California 93943.
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However, glasnost, perestroika and not being anywhere near a
sub for the entire cruise had fostered apathy for the ASW
mission.
Search and rescue work had been the order of the day for
the rotorheads for the last 100 days. Nothing was more boring
than wasting away one's young life waiting for others to fall
overboard. The helo boys were out for an early morning
joyride and nothing more. The whirlybird hurled itself at
the horizon making all of eighty knots.
Time was 0630. Thirty miles out from the carrier, Lts.
'Ready Freddie' Taubman and 'Fast Eddie' Glickstein began to
arc back and forth ahead of the ship. Together, they were
known as 'The Pros From Dover.' Freddie wasn't too swift,
which made him all the more loveable of a helo guy. Eddie
was the intellectual. To pass the time at sea, he read the
likes of 'The Adventures of Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles.'
These two were definitely the right stuffl
Time was 0645. The H-3 droned on ahead of its ship,
arcing from 315 degrees to 045 degrees relative to the heading
of Ranger. They held an arc of 30 nautical miles as they flow
across the Pacific. It was normal for H-3's to maintain
altitudes of 150 to 300 feet above the sea level.
Like a mirage in a desert, Fast Eddie saw what he thought
was a periscope. They called in with the time and position
of the submarine sighting. It wasn't known whether this was
a good guy or a bad guy sub. Once in six months, they had
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some excitement as they began to weave the black art of ASW
about their prey.
In the Ranger ASW Command Module, Lcdr. 'Hoot' Hawler was
standing watch over consoles and receivers processing ASW
input. At the first contact, he "roger'd" the holo and told
it to passively investigate the sighting. "Probably a school
of fish," he told himself.
Of more interest to Hawler was a method of training
himself and his men in the manipulation of their acoustic
processors and particularly the actual steps to follow in case
of a real underwater attack. He just didn't know enough
about ASW. Nor did he feel anybody else onboard was qualified,
to confidently make recommendations to the carrier skipper
about the conduct of a capital ship in battle with a submerged
opponent.
Time was 0700. Contact was held at 30 nautical miles
dead ahead of the carrier. The carrier was steaming due east
at 15 knots. The 'Pros from Dover' dropped a pattern of
passive buoys to investigate their contact. Then they began
monitoring the buoys for acoustic responses to transmit back
to the Ranger. Initial course and speed on the target was
360 degrees True at 7 knots.
Time was 0715. The holo crew was excited. They were now
matching wits with a potential adversary. However, they
weren't getting much of a reaction from the carrier. "Hell,"
thought Freddie, "we're out here doing our job up against what
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could be the start of World War III and those yo-yo's back at
the ranch just keep steaming into torpedo attack range."
Eddie likened the vulnerability of the oncoming carrier to
the battlewagons at Pearl Harbor in 1941.
Time was 0745. The submarine changed course and was
closing on Ranger. Tho helo crew radioed the change back Lo
the ASW Module. Lcdr. Howler was visiting the head when this
news came in A senior chief heard the radio call and
notified the ship's Combat Information Center that an
unidentified submarine was closing on them.
This news spread fast. The ship's captain knew about the
sub by 0820. By this time, the reported position of the
submarine was 350 degrees relative to Ranger at a distance of
10 miles. The skipper wanted to change course to increase
the distance between Ranger and the sub. However, the
morning's first launch and recovery of aircraft was in full
swing. He decided to finish with the aviation business of
launching first. Then he'd check on what the helo guys had
to say.
Time was 0830. The ASW Module had compiled acoustic data
from the helo. It seemed the sub was a foe, likely modern
and nuclear-propelled. The Ranger CO didn't care about that.
"Damn it," he yelled, "we're at peace, now finish the aircraft
recovery!" The ship steamed on, holding its course.
Time was 084b. "The Pros" had an active dipping sonar
contact on the sub. Sonar contact was intermittent. They
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weren't losing this guy, but, he was definitely trying to
shake them off.
Eddie looked over his shoulder and maw Ranger 5 miles
back. It looked like the morning air recovery had just
ended. If the submarino had wanted to start shooting, the
war, for the Ranger, would be over.
Time was 090U. The Air Boas called the halo in for a hot
pump/crew switch. They broke off contact with the sub and
headed back to the ship. Freddie was furious that the ship
had ignored their warnings and steamed into what could have
been harm's way. Even a small change in the ship's course
could have made a big difference, Expertise was needed for
the carrier and fastl
Hawler was aware of what had gone on. He called down to
the helo ready room and asked the helo pilots to debrief him.
Before he spoke with the Ranger CO he wanted the whole story
and a way to prevent this from happening again.
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VZZ * T3&CXZIG tiOTI: 3UBMU=~
A. Overview
Decision support is an area of information technology with
tremendous potential for fleet applications. Decision
support systems (b$$) can embody entire tactical doctrines in
order to assist the human decision-maker in difficult
situations such as the 'heat of battle.' DSS are used to
help solve semistructured problems (managerial or tactical)
typical to the world of the naval officer. Problem
identification, alternative solution formulation and solution
evaluation are all features provided by the information
technology inherent to the decision support system.
This case is a look toward the future of shipboard IS,
particularly an application of a decision support system.
The opportunity here is that many of the COM students'
grasp of DSS is oriented to the level of writing code. What
they need is a scenario in which they can deal with putting a
DSS to work to some organizational purpose.
The ASW module in this cate is not listening to the
request from the helo for guidance. The response is not
forthcoming because the ASW officer is without a clue as to
how to proceed tactically. Information is available but the
ASW module lacks any model of tactics as to how to make use of
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that information. Explicitly, the ASW officer has no
training in deriving tactical solutions,
The concern here is whether the students will see DSS as
the solution. Again, the problem is not information sharing
as it was with BUDNUT, but rather information processing,
transforming data into elements for decision making. Would
a DSS clear up the limits and difficulties portrayed in this
case?
A technical issue here is whether the solution is a DSS or
an expert system. Is the need for a system that supports
decision making or for a system that makes the decisions?
What organizational structure will support the effective
use of a DSS in this situation? Describe the structure now.
Then, describe how it might be altered to advantage.
a. Case Use
This case study was prepared for use in the Computer
Systems Management Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California. It can also be used by
students from other curricula, studying the basic concepts of
information mystems, It has particular application
demonstrating the needs for an organizational database to
students to IS 3183, 'Management of Information Systems.'
The case is of particular value in introducing the need and
usefulness of management information systems.
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C. AnalysLs of Case
The anti-submarine warfare (ASW) defense of an aircraft
carrier is characterized by large inputs of raw information
which must be processed and refined quickly to produce a
course of action. Tactical data are transmitted to the ship
and thence to the ASW Command Center for dissemination to the
ASW staff experts to assess the current tactical situation and
prescribe course of action. The nature of the problem that
ASW experts will solve is determined by the level of ASW
knowledge onboard, intelligence about the ASW threat and enemy
tactics. The problem is the stress of the battle which
produces costly errors at the worst times. This problem is
developed in a three-level arena of above, below and on the
ocean.
The users of this proposed expert system are the ASW
dccision-deocision-makerm involved in the assessment of the
initial submarine contact. Those users are experienced
professionals in not only ASW but also high technology
interfacing with tactical decision-making. However, the
current use of computers in solving these problems is limited
to the analog nnalysis of raw acoustic information and the
decisions made are entirely human.
The purpose of this proposed system is to provide the ASW
experts with an assessment of the tactical situation
integrated with current intelligence data based upon threat
information. Accordingly, a more accurate distribution of
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knowledge will favor an ASW decision-maker. This
organization of knowledge will instill in the user a
familiarity with the latest ASW expertise. As human errors
will be reduced by interaction with this system, more
consistent decisions will be reached and the costs of training
professionals will be significantly reduced.
This system will suggest the initial action to take when
faced with an unidentified submarine contact. This system
will be designed for an open-ocean deep-water operating
environment. Peacetime steaming practices and alert status
are assumed in this scenario. This system will compile all
information on the unidentified contact, the analysis of the
threat posed and infer the initial recommended action.
Information such as magnetic and acoustic signatures, visual
sightings and ESM detections will come from fixed- and rotary-
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